Europe uses raw materials in many industries from green and digital tech to defence. Some are produced within Europe, like hafnium in France, but the majority are imported. When Europe is dependent on a single supplier, as is the case with manganese, magnesium, strontium, or bismuth from China, or feldspar and boron from Turkey, our industries face risks if that supply runs dry. This can happen because of reasons beyond control, like a global pandemic or economic coercion to obtain political concessions. The Critical Raw Materials Act has interesting proposals on monitoring, stockpiling and demand coordination to anticipate those risks. It places a lot of attention on increasing the extraction and refining of raw materials in Europe. This inward-looking response, however, misses the fact that most of the action will take place outside the EU. Especially for green tech, most raw materials enter the EU already embedded in products such as solar panels, permanent magnets or EV batteries. Europe must pay close attention to the supply of its own suppliers. China’s dominance in refining stands out: it refines 99% of the cobalt extracted in Congo and 94% of the lithium extracted in Australia. By boosting the demand for clean tech goods, the green transition creates a dual challenge. First, much larger amounts of minerals must be brought online, especially lithium, cobalt and manganese. Second, this should be done without reinforcing existing concentration. The EU should support a trade-policy environment and concrete investments abroad that diversify global supply chains by making better use of its foreign investment policy, the Global Gateway.,The Why Axis is a weekly newsletter distributed by Bruegel, bringing you the latest research on European economic policy.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy crisis has made the European Union acutely aware of its exposure to geopolitical risks in key supply chains. Policymakers are now asking whether, in its drive to decarbonise its economy, Europe risks creating new dependencies. For example, when replacing an internal combustion engine car running on Russian fossil fuels by an electric vehicle with batteries made from Chinese minerals, will one dependency just be swapped for another?
今天，欧盟委员会发布了关于；《净零行业法》；以及a；《关键原材料法》；作为其；绿色交易产业计划-欧盟对美国《通胀削减法案》的回应我们的目标是将气候政治、经济和政策转化为行动 关于–E3G
价格合理且可持续的锂离子电池是电动汽车市场发展和绿色能源转型的关键。报废电池的循环经济解决方案可以帮助解决初级投入中断问题，同时降低与这些投入的开采或电池生产相关的环境成本。随着锂离子电池寿命的结束，循环价值链也将有助于解决废物和处理问题。这些链还处于起步阶段，因为复杂的电池设计、材料化学成分和不足的废物库存阻碍了它们的生存能力，但预计的增长应该会支持盈利能力。在国内废物流不足以实现经济上可行的回收所需规模的市场，或者基础设施不足导致依赖国外回收能力的市场，锂离子电池废物的国际贸易仍然至关重要。促进锂离子电池的循环价值链需要更加明确这些电池的废物地位、运输和储存安全法规的一致性、贸易便利化和电池设计标准的统一、废物收集和回收率的监管目标，以及管理和回收计划。
这项研究评估了欧盟在获取包含关键原材料（CRM）的产品方面的需求和脆弱性，这些产品是在不断变化的地缘政治背景下实现绿色和数字化转型所需的。它概述了更广泛的情况以及政策背景。该研究旨在确定从原材料到最终产品的供应链的哪个阶段，欧洲工业生态系统依赖CRM进口。它审查了JRC设计的CRM方法，以确定哪些材料是关键的，需要特别关注。目前的方法可以受益于范围的扩大，包括对产品组和部门的评估。一项研究发现，建立欧盟储备设施可以缓解原材料和零部件的供应中断。然而，建立储存设施需要有效的公私管理
