第28届联合国气候变化大会（COP28）和国际能源署（IEA）高级别对话就能源转型的关键要素达成了强有力的共识。这一结论标志着联合主席、COP28主席苏丹·贾比尔博士和国际能源署执行主任法提赫·比罗尔博士取得了重大成就。

本文件简要介绍了欧洲联盟最外层区域可再生能源的发展情况，重点是这些区域在创造可持续经济发展机会的同时促进绿色过渡的潜力。报告审查了欧盟其他区域在可再生能源方面的现有政策框架和工具，并提出了具体的政策建议。本文件是在欧盟-经合组织全球最外层区域项目框架内编写的。

国际能源署对全球进展的最新评估显示，一些清洁能源技术（如太阳能光伏和电动汽车）的部署速度表明，只要有足够的雄心和政策行动，就可以实现目标，但能源系统的大多数组成部分迫切需要更快的变革，以在2050年前实现净零排放。

If a hydrogen economy is to become a reality, along with efficient and decarbonized production and adequate transportation infrastructure, deployment of suitable hydrogen storage facilities will be crucial.This is because, due to various technical and economic reasons, there is a serious possibility of an imbalance between hydrogen supply and demand. Hydrogen storage could also be pivotal in promoting renewable energy sources and facilitating the decarbonization process by providing long durationstorage options, which other forms of energy storage, such as batteries with capacity limitations or pumped hydro with geographical limitations, cannot meet. However, hydrogen is not the easiest substance to store and handle. Under ambient conditions, the extremely low volumetric energy densityof hydrogen does not allow for its efficient and economic storage, which means it needs to be compressed, liquefied, or converted into other substances that are easier to handle and store. Currently,there are different hydrogen storage solutions at varying levels of technology, market, and commercial readiness, with different applications depending on the circumstances. This paper evaluates the relativemerits and techno-economic features of major types of hydrogen storage options: (i) pure hydrogen storage, (ii) synthetic hydrocarbons, (iii) chemical hydrides, (iv) liquid organic hydrogen carriers, (v) metal hydrides, and (vi) porous materials. The paper also discusses the main barriers to investment in hydrogen storage and highlights key features of a viable  usiness model, in particular the policy and regulatory framework needed to address the primary risks to which potential hydrogen storage investorsare exposed.

Every year, the Japanese and global energy situations experience various great changes and are exposed to their impacts. In 2022, however, historically unprecedented changes rattled…

Development of a hydrogen economy will depend on adequate transportation infrastructure. Most discussion of hydrogen transportation to date has focused on adapting natural gas networks, but the issue is more complex. Hydrogen can also be transported by dedicated new pipelines as well as other transportation networks (e.g., truck, rail, and marine transport) and even produced on-site by transferring electrical energy instead of hydrogen. In future, end users’ ability to switch from one form of delivery to another will result in new linkages between these diverse infrastructures in the sense that energy flows of different sectors will become more interdependent, and the widespread use of hydrogen is likely to strengthen this. This raises the fundamental question of how to prevent inefficiency (such as unnecessarily high hydrogen infrastructure costs or suboptimal utilization of gas and power networks) and redundancy in the future hydrogen transport infrastructure. This task is made more challenging by technological uncertainty, the unpredictability of future supply and demand for hydrogen, network externality effects, and investment irreversibility of grid-based infrastructures. Meeting these challenges entails coordinating investments in hydrogen transportation infrastructures across all modes in order to establish a cross-sectoral hydrogen polygrid. This paper analyses the strengths and shortcomings of three possible approaches—centrally coordinated, market-based, and regulatory—to this task. Finally, the paper offers policy recommendations on establishing a coherent institutional framework governing investment in the future hydrogen polygrid.

South America is endowed with vast energy resources and natural gas plays an important role in the supply of energy to the region. A few countries in the Southern Cone area such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, also meet part of their demand needs with imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) and/or pipeline gas. In line with the objectives of diversifying to indigenous sources, reduce GHG emissions and advance the Paris Agenda towards net-zero emissions, there has been a push to increase the use of renewable sources in those countries, mainly solar and wind. In 2019 the installed capacity of wind energy more than doubled in Argentina year-on-year (albeit from a small base) whilst solar grew 19.6 per cent and 23.9 per cent in Brazil and Chile respectively.For many years, South American countries have been looking for viable ways to develop decarbonized gas such as biomethane, biogas and, more recently, hydrogen. This paper analyzes the efforts by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to decarbonize gas to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, including some significant projects already being developed and in operation. The paper also assesses the initiatives, timing and challenges, and describe the bottlenecks – including costs, infrastructure, financing and regulatory issues – impacting on the development of projects and the more widespread use of biogas, biomethane and hydrogen in these economies. Finally, the possibility of creating a regional market for decarbonized gas is investigated.Looking at the region overall, there is significant potential for biogas and biomethane in Argentina and Brazil, but less so in Chile. In order to realise that potential, particularly for biomethane further incentives and regulations will be required. For hydrogen, while PV seems to be the most competitive source for green hydrogen, levelised costs of green hydrogen remain at least double the cost of hydrogen from natural gas without CCUS. Although the three countries are pursuing decarbonised gas projects, initial planning is still in progress and there is a lack of sufficient coordination between government and policy makers to drive the development. Particularly for hydrogen, large scale developments are likely to be beyond the current NDC horizon of 2030, but putting a clear transition pathway in place soon will increase the likelihood of achieving the significant potential for decarbonized gases in the three Southern Cone countries.

In the second report in a series from Resources for the Future and Environmental Defense Fund, an international team of scholars analyzes the United Kingdom’s policies to support declining coal communities and offers lessons for policymakers.

This report examines key lessons from the decline in coal production in Germany to highlight policies to support workers and communities in the energy transition.

Hundreds of US counties may experience substantial wage and employment changes due to a shift away from fossil fuels.

As the United States undergoes an unprecedented shift away from carbon-intensive energy sources and towards a clean energy future, federal policy will play a major role in supporting workers and regions that are affected, including low-income, rural, and minority communities. The transition to clean energy will have particularly significant implications for people and places where coal, oil, and natural gas serve as a major driver of jobs and economic activity, and where consumers may be especially burdened by changes in the energy system.This report lays out a variety of proposals to help enable an equitable energy transition. It is not intended to be a comprehensive strategy, but instead offers a menu of options that policymakers can choose among to enable this transition while enhancing energy equity and resilience, reducing environmental damages, spurring clean energy innovation, and supporting economic and workforce development in vulnerable communities.

Colstrip, Montana, is a small, isolated community that was established in the 1920s for the express purpose of mining coal. Later in the 20th century, the town became home to a large coal-fired power plant, which has since been the bedrock of the local economy. In 2020, however, two of the plant’s four units were retired, the future of the remaining two units is highly uncertain, and a history of groundwater contamination caused by coal ash poses additional challenges for future economic development. These issues, particularly the uncertainty over the plant’s future, have been exacerbated by the complex ownership structure of the plant, which has made it difficult for local leaders to establish a clear transition plan. Although state and federal policymakers have attempted to intervene, transition planning efforts to date have been ad hoc and not well coordinated. Colstrip’s experience highlights the importance of providing more certainty for communities in transition. It also suggests the need for more coordination among local, state, and federal stakeholders while providing more robust planning and transition support. Looking forward, isolated, resource-dependent communities like Colstrip will face considerable challenges in an energy transition. Federal and state policymakers can help create better outcomes by striving to provide more certainty along with technical and financial support to facilitate locally driven transition efforts.

The recent adoption by the UK and Norway of ‘net zero’ and ‘climate neutrality’ targets by 2050 has galvanised the upstream oil and gas industry in both countries to adopt GHG emission reduction targets for 2030 and 2050 for the first time. Meeting these targets, ensuring an appropriate sharing of costs between investors and taxpayers and preserving investor confidence will present a lasting challenge to governments and industry. The scale of the challenge on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is far greater than on the more mature UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) since the remaining resource base is much larger, the expected future production decline is less severe and the emission intensity on the NCS is already much lower (10 kg CO2e/boe) than on the UKCS (28 kgCO2e/boe). Norway is expected to deliver future CO2 emission reduction through an extension of its existing power-from-shore electrification programme. The high cost of such investment, borne mainly by the state via the tax system, is a political and social choice made by Norway to reduce upstream CO2 emissions without giving up its commitment to develop its remaining offshore resources.On the UKCS, the new industry target to reduce GHG emissions by 50 per cent by 2030 will require the integration of emission abatement into the OGA’s MER UK strategy, well-designed economic incentives, including possibly carbon pricing and fiscal reform, and behavioural changes from operators. The relatively short remaining economic life of many mature fields and the dispersed nature of offshore power demand penalises both power-from-shore and CCS as routes to least-cost emission reduction but future integration with offshore renewable electricity generation may offer some abatement opportunities at larger installations. Methane emissions have for some years been a blind spot for government and industry on the UKCS. The UKCS has the potential to reduce methane emissions significantly from flaring, venting and leakage through better emission reporting, a more robust consents regime and changes to operating practices.

Policymakers in the US and around the world are grappling with how to understand the security implications of an energy system in transition—and if they aren’t, they should be. Recent attacks on Saudi facilities show that oil supply remains vulnerable to disruption. New energy forms can help reduce vulnerability to oil supply outages, but they also have the potential to introduce new vulnerabilities and risks. The US and its allies have spent the past 50 years building a robust domestic and international response system to mitigate risks to oil supplies, but similar arrangements for other energy forms remain limited. This paper offers a framework for assessing energy security based on an evaluation of vulnerability, risk, and offsets; this approach has been a useful tool for assessing oil security for the past 50 years, and it can be relevant for assessing energy security in an energy system in transition.

In the last couple of years there has been increasing recognition by key players in the European gas industry that to mitigate the risk of terminal decline in the context of a decarbonising energy system, there will need to be rapid scale up of decarbonised gas. This has led to several projections of the scale of decarbonised gas which could potentially be supplied by 2030, 2040 or 2050. This paper, joint with the Sustainable Gas Institute at Imperial College, London, considers the very significant rate of scale up and the significant cost reductions contemplated by such projections. Based on a database of actual announced projects (both committed and in earlier stages of development) for production of decarbonised gas, it then considers the extent to which project activity is consistent with meeting the ambitious projections. It identifies a significant gap in current levels of activity, largely because there is not yet sufficient economic incentive for investors to develop the required projects. It is intended that this paper will form the basis of continued tracking of the level of activity over the coming years, to help inform industry players of further actions which may be required.

This paper looks at the possible role of ‘green gas’ in the decarbonisation of heat in the United Kingdom. The option is under active discussion at the moment because of the UK’s rigorous carbon reduction targets and the growing realisation that there are problems with the ‘default’ option of electrifying heat. Green gas appears to be technically and economically feasible. However, as the paper discusses, there are major practical and policy obstacles which make it unlikely that the government will commit itself to developing ‘green gas’ in the foreseeable future.

Modelling studies suggest that COP21 targets can be met with global gas demand peaking in the 2030s and declining slowly thereafter. This would qualify gas to be considered a `transition fuel’ to a low carbon economy. However, such an outcome is by no means a foregone conclusion. There are limited numbers of countries outside the OECD which can be expected to afford to pay wholesale (or import) prices of $6-8/MMbtu and above, which are needed to remunerate 2017 delivery costs of large volumes of gas from new pipeline gas or LNG projects. Prices towards the top of (and certainly above) this range are likely to make gas increasingly uncompetitive leading to progressive demand destruction even in OECD countries. The current debate in the gas community is when the `glut’ of LNG will dissipate, and the global supply/demand balance will tighten. The unspoken assumption is that when this happens – generally believed to be around the early/mid 2020s – prices will rise somewhere close to 2011-14 levels, allowing a return to profitability for projects which came on stream since the mid-2010s and allowing new projects to move forward. Should this assumption prove be correct, it will create major problems for the future of gas. The key to gas fulfilling its potential role as a transition fuel up to and beyond 2030, is that it must be delivered to high income markets below $8/MMbtu, and to low income markets below $6/MMbtu (and ideally closer to $5/MMbtu). The major challenge to the future of gas will be to ensure that it does not become (and in many low-income countries remain) unaffordable and/or uncompetitive, long before its emissions make it unburnable.

As much of the world pushes ahead with the deployment of renewable energy, resource-rich MENA economies are lagging behind. For the region to catch up, new policies are required to remove barriers of entry to the industry and create investment incentives. This paper contends that while the main obstacles to deployment of renewables are grid infrastructure inadequacy, insufficient institutional capacity, and risks and uncertainties, the investment incentives lie on a policy instrument spectrum with two polar solutions: (i) the incentive is provided entirely through the market (removing all forms of fossil fuel subsidies and internalising the cost of externalities); or (ii) the incentive is provided through a full government subsidy programme (in addition to the existing fossil fuel subsidies). However, there is a trade-off between the two dimensions of the fiscal burden and political acceptance across the policy instrument spectrum, which implies that the two polar solutions themselves are not easily and fully implementable in these countries. Therefore, we propose a combinatorial approach in which the incentive for renewables deployment is provided through a partial renewable subsidy program and partial fossil fuel price reform in a way that balances the fiscal pressure on the government against political acceptability. Additionally, the paper argues that the fact resource-rich countries are behind advanced economies in electricity sector reform gives them a last-mover advantage in the sense that they can tap into years of international experience to avoid design mistakes and create a sustainable solution that is compatible with renewables deployment and their own context.

In this study, Mari Luomi examines how the resource-rich GCC countries are positioning themselves in the international relations of the green economy, focusing on the UAE’s state-led efforts to acquire the means of implementation for a national green energy transition. The study addresses four questions: What strategies, external relations, and engagements have the UAE and other GCC states developed over recent years that support a transition to a green energy economy? How are these engagements providing the means of implementation for a green economy transition? Are the national policy frameworks aligned with such a transition? What lessons can be drawn from the UAE’s experience by the other GCC states?The study concludes that, as the case of the UAE demonstrates, there are multiple ways in which the GCC states can actively employ their financial resources through external engagements to support a broader national green economy vision. However, enabling environments which are crucial for directing investments into green activities, jobs and infrastructure, are only beginning to emerge, and a lot of work still remains to be done in all six states, particularly in the areas of energy subsidy reform and sustainable job creation in productive sectors. The study closes with a number of related observations and recommendations.

这一估计是由能源长期供需展望小组委员会提出的，该小组委员会讨论了包括核能和可再生能源在内的能源的未来最佳组合。据估计，节能措施将减少用电量至9373亿千瓦时，低于2012年的9680亿千瓦时。到2030年，与不采取节能措施的情况相比，减少的能源消耗相当于4600万升原油。这相当于日本2013年3.7亿千升(原油当量)能源消耗的10%以上。具体的节能措施包括切换到LED照明，引进高节能电器，提高汽车的油耗。

近年来，美国清洁能源行业在立法方面取得了巨大胜利，特别是通过了《通胀削减法案》、《两党基础设施法》和《芯片法案》。但是，这些法律和随之而来的投资是否会产生足够的无碳电力？

This report, Enhancing China's ETS for Carbon Neutrality: Focus on Power Sector, responds to the Chinese government’s invitation to the IEA to co-operate on carbon emissions trading systems (ETS) and synergies across energy and climate policies. It shows that an enhanced ETS could lead the electricity sector toward an emissions trajectory that is in line with China’s carbon neutrality target. This report also explores the interactions and effects of China’s national ETS with its renewable energy policy in the electricity sector, namely renewable portfolio standards (RPS). It examines the impact of different Enhanced ETS Scenarios on CO2 emissions, generation mix, cost‑effectiveness and interaction with RPS

This commentary is part of Energy Rewired, a project from the CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program studying the industrial strategies of major economies for the energy transition. The

Technologies to capture and store carbon must be part of the arsenal to fight climate change. To deploy them at scale, policymakers should expand federal incentives, increase RD&D for traditional and novel technologies, and expedite permitting and siting of requisite infrastructure.

ITIF is pleased to submit the following comments to the Department of Energy’s Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Managements request for information regarding the opportunity for carbon capture and direct air capture technologies.

Carbon pricing has been adopted as a key climate policy measure in an increasing number of jurisdictions. With much of the world moving towards net-zero targets since the entry into force of the Paris Agreement,

This commentary is part of Energy Rewired, a project from the CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program studying the industrial strategies of major economies for the energy transition. The

Carbon border adjustments confront the trade and climate nexus with two primary policy paths: a race to the bottom or a virtuous circle. A race to the bottom scenario occurs when countries abandon

Democrats in Congress may have to shrink the size of the proposed spending package, the Build Back Better Act, to get the Senate votes necessary to pass it under budget reconciliation. The Washington

Soil carbon sequestration has gained traction within the Biden administration as a way for farmers to reduce or even reverse U.S. agriculture’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To advance this

After a decade of planning and trials, China officially launched a national carbon trading market last week. Called the national emissions trading scheme (ETS), it initially targets carbon emissions

Download the Brief The Issue This brief is the sixth and final in a series on achieving net-zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program hosted

This report discusses how Denmark - a country whose major agricultural organizations have committed to become carbon neutral by 2050 - can achieve carbon neutral agriculture. The report’s lessons can inform not only Denmark’s agricultural future, but also that of other advanced agricultural economies.

大型能源买家（包括公司和城市）在清洁能源转型中发挥着重要作用。但在未来几十年里，大型能源买家将需要更进一步，采取更多行动，帮助到 2050 年创建零碳电网。这些行动——被称为“变革性采购实践”——可以优化清洁能源的方式、时间和地点部署是为了帮助减少长期排放。

The terrestrial carbon sink provides a critical negative feedback to climate warming, yet large uncertainty exists on its long-term dynamics. Here we combined terrestrial biosphere models (TBMs) and climate projections, together with climate-specific land use change, to investigate both the trend and interannual variability (IAV) of the terrestrial carbon sink from 1986 to 2099 under two representative concentration pathways RCP2.6 and RCP6.0. The results reveal a saturation of the terrestrial carbon sink by the end of this century under RCP6.0 due to warming and declined CO2 effects. Compared to 1986-2005 (0.96±0.44 Pg C yr-1), during 2080-2099 the terrestrial carbon sink would decrease to 0.60±0.71 Pg C yr-1 but increase to 3.36±0.77 Pg C yr-1, respectively, under RCP2.6 and RCP6.0. The carbon sink caused by CO2, land use change and climate change during 2080-2099 is -0.08±0.11 Pg C yr-1, 0.44±0.05 Pg C yr-1, and 0.24±0.70 Pg C yr-1 under RCP2.6, and 4.61±0.17 Pg C yr-1, 0.22±0.07 Pg C yr-1, and -1.47±0.72 Pg C yr-1 under RCP6.0. In addition, the carbon sink IAV shows stronger variance under RCP6.0 than RCP2.6. Under RCP2.6, temperature shows higher correlation with the carbon sink IAV than precipitation in most time, which however is the opposite under RCP6.0. These results suggest that the role of terrestrial carbon sink in curbing climate warming would be weakened in a no-mitigation world in future, and active mitigation efforts are required as assumed under RCP2.6.

Japan became the latest major economy to publicly announce it aims to achieve economy-wide carbon neutrality by 2050, a goal made during the Japanese version of the U.S. State of the Union by newly minted prime minister Suga Yoshihide on October 26. Previously committing itself to an 80 percent reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions by 2050, Japan updated its target. The commitment necessitates an ambitious pace and scope of transformation in the country’s energy and industrial structures. The country’s power sector, which depends on fossil fuels for over 70 percent of supply, is the leading source of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by Japan today. Despite achieving a 24 percent reduction in CO2 emissions between 2013 and 2018, the sector remains responsible for about half of the country’s CO2 emissions, followed by the transportation sector (19 percent), the industrial sector (18 percent), and the commercial and residential sector (10 percent). How much and how quickly the country can transform the power supply mix is, therefore, crucial for Japan’s success in meeting the net zero emissions by 2050. The new pledge also necessitates a broader buy-in from the business community beyond the power sector. For example, between 2013 and 2018, carbon emissions by Japan’s industrial sector reduced 8 percent, while those by the transportation sector reduced 15 percent. There clearly is a long way to go, but there is a foundation to build upon. Under the auspices of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), over 100 private companies and business associations from the industrial, commercial, transportation, and energy sectors have developed or adopted low-carbon action plans through 2030. These plans generally seek to maximize the use of best available technologies as well as expand renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, not only along the manufacturing process, but also in business operation. Furthermore, the Japan Climate Leaders’ Partnership—a coalition of over 150 companies—has been calling for greater adoption of a 2050 carbon neutrality pledge in the corporate world by promoting global initiatives like RE100 within Japan. Japanese companies with a 2050 net-zero pledge include JERA, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Toyota. In particular, success by JERA, which is the largest electric power generating company in Japan and the largest company that imports liquefied natural gas in the world, would have a significant effect on the national success. Meanwhile, a few others with a 2050 goal have a reduction target at 80 percent, presumably to conform to the earlier commitment by the Japanese government. Notably, associations from some carbon intensive sectors, such as steel and cement making, also have developed detailed long-term carbon reduction pathways even if they lack a specific zero-carbon commitment. The national pledge will likely compel many to update their existing carbon reduction action plans and strategies. In his speech, Prime Minister Suga stressed the role of innovation in enabling such a transformation and called for Japan to emerge as a leader in the global clean energy industry. Carbon neutrality goals present a set of economic, political, and societal challenges to any country. So the right question is not whether Japan will be able to deliver on its commitment by 2050, but how widely the vision can garner the public support as the pledge urges a diverse set of stakeholders to reimagine the future of its economy in unison. Japan has begun formulating its triennial Basic Energy Plan, due out in 2021. Under the existing plan, issued in 2018, natural gas and coal would account for 63 percent of the country’s electricity supply in 2030, followed by renewables for 22-24 percent, and nuclear energy for 20-22 percent. According to the latest study by the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, the country’s CO2 emissions from the electricity sector under the reference scenario (which generally comports to the existing energy plan) will decrease from about 1,080 million tons (mt) today, to 940 mt in 2030, and to 738 mt in 2050. Interestingly, under the report’s advanced technologies scenario, the country can further reduce the emissions level to 483 mt in 2050 if the share of fossil fuel-based power supply decreases from 73 percent today to 16 percent in 2050 and if the shares of solar and wind grow, respectively, from 6 percent to 18 percent (3.4 percent annually) and from 0.7 percent to 20 percent (10.7 percent annually). The share of nuclear energy will also need to rise from 6.2 percent today to 22 percent in 2050. The carbon neutrality vision clearly demands a substantial revision of the current outlook. The zero-emissions pledge will likely propel the new Basic Energy Plan to double down on renewables and energy efficiency while also promoting hydrogen and carbon capture and recycle technologies. Beyond that, how extensively the country’s coal policy will be revised, as noted in the prime minister’s speech, and whether the urgency of decarbonization can help the government overcome lingering opposition to nuclear energy are some of the questions that warrant close attention. Additionally, how much the carbon neutrality pledge can mobilize needed investment in low-emission technology development and deployment, and how the climate commitment may affect Japan’s resource diplomacy, which has traditionally valued strong ties with countries with hydrocarbon resource wealth, remains to be seen. Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

China’s announcement that it intends to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 is a game changer for international climate policy. It has considerable implications for the EU’s climate and industrial policy.China still needs to translate this political promise into concrete goals with verifiable intermediate targets. But its goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 is in some ways a more ambitious long-term climate goal than the EU’s, despite the 10-year difference in target years (and the different greenhouse gases covered).When considering the different growth trajectories, China’s target is undoubtedly more ambitious than that of the EU. China will need to reduce emissions at a far faster pace than the EU has managed so far, both in absolute and relative terms, but given its high savings rate, it can afford the vast investments needed to green its economy. On the road to carbon neutrality, China will become the biggest market for low-carbon technology.Will this be in competition or cooperation with Europe? For the EU, proposals such as the “carbon border adjustment mechanism” may suddenly be an uneasy fit. There may be stiff competition for the development of climate-neutral technology, especially for energy-intensive industries, which are fundamental to the debate about industrial competitiveness and the risk of carbon leakage.

The European Green Deal is many things, but the one proposal that most animates outsiders, especially in the United States, is the idea of implementing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which is basically a tax on imported goods based on their carbon content. On its surface, the proposition is reasonable: if Europe decarbonizes faster than other countries, it should not impose undue costs on domestic producers that exporters to Europe do not bear. The carbon border adjustment mechanism avoids that problem by taking into account the carbon intensity of goods sold into the European Union. But the proposal can create as many problems as it solves—depending on how it is implemented. The Why and How of Carbon Border Adjustments The mechanism is a response to “carbon leakage.” A carbon price imposes costs, and if foreign suppliers do not bear these costs, they will gain an advantage. Over time, production will shift to jurisdictions that do not impose this tax, and the country that imposed the measure in the first place will have punished its industry while doing little to limit (global) emissions. The solution to this problem, so far, has been to exempt industry from having to pay these costs by allocating emission rights to them for free. Now Europe wants to impose a cost on imported goods to offset whatever advantage they might have. In practice, there is mixed evidence of carbon leakage. Several Western countries have gone through a form of deindustrialization, but it is hard to say whether this has been due to energy costs or other factors. In Europe, moreover, heavy industry has received allowances to emit for free, shielding it from carbon costs. How can carbon leakage be measured if heavy industry is not exposed to its full effects? We also know that energy is a significant cost driver for only a few industries; like earlier concerns about environmental dumping, which never truly materialized, this might be a threat that exists mostly in theory, not practice. The mechanics of implementing a carbon border adjustment are complex as well—so complex in fact that one must wonder if this could happen at all. There are, at the core, four questions. First, what industries to cover, on what basis, and how far upstream should the system go? Second, what is the best way to measure emissions and verify the numbers? Third, how should the carbon border adjustment relate to other carbon costs—say the European Emissions Trading Scheme that already exists, or whatever carbon price a foreign producer might have paid already. And fourth, under what mechanism would such measure be implemented, can the system be made compatible with existing obligations under the World Trade Organization and existing EU powers, or will implementation depend on new rules? This is a policy, therefore, that tries to solve a problem that might not be a problem, and it is cumbersome and complicated to implement—so much so that it is unclear if such a measure could ever work in practice. Is it possible that trying to implement this measure leads to cross-border conflict and serves as a distraction from other, more collaborative policy measures? It all depends on how the measure is designed and implemented. What Are the Benefits? The most important reason to impose a carbon border adjustment mechanism is to secure the buy-in of local industry for deeper decarbonization policies. It is hard for any country to agree on aggressive targets, and it is harder to do so when powerful constituencies—people with money and connections and companies that employ a lot of people—are fighting against these measures. Regardless of how much carbon leakage exists in practice, powerful people see it as a problem. Offering a solution to that problem might help garner support or, at least, lessen opposition. Read that way, a carbon border adjustment mechanism is helpful because it enables a country to be more ambitious—regardless of what other countries do and how they respond. And if the country in question is big enough, efforts by industry to decarbonize might help develop new practices and technologies that might be useful to other countries as well. The second benefit is to develop some infrastructure that might be needed down the line. One can imagine a future where the carbon content of a good really matters—where consumers want to know whether more or less carbon was emitted in the production of one good over another, or whether governments taxed carbon emissions even if those emissions originated in a foreign country. Doing these things will depend on a complex ecosystem: rules on what to measure and how; processes for real-time and independent verification; and an apparatus to ensure compliance, avoid double counting, and check whether the rules are achieving their intended purpose. This infrastructure exists, to an extent, within different countries, but an effort to harmonize standards across countries would be essential. The carbon border adjustment mechanism is a vehicle to accelerate that conversation—even if the end goal is years away and has to overcome serious practical obstacles along the way. The third benefit, in theory at least, is that this tax will induce companies to adopt lower-carbon technologies in order to access or be more competitive in a market where the carbon intensity of a good matters for the bottom line. Whether this happens in practice, however, depends on two factors: how many countries sign up, and how ambitious the measure ends up being. The Price Must Be Right If Europe implements a carbon border adjustment mechanism alone, it becomes a low-carbon island. Exporters who are competitive in that environment will keep exporting to Europe, and others will sell their goods elsewhere. If more countries join—the United States and Japan, for example—the island now encompasses a significant share of the world economy, and suddenly, companies have greater incentive to invest in low-carbon technologies to be able to sell into that big market. Eventually, as more countries join, the world effectively adopts a version of a global price on carbon. How this evolves, however, depends on the level of ambition that countries in the “club” have. If the ambition is high, the cost on carbon is likely to be high as well, and it is entirely possible to see a world where a carbon border adjustment becomes a major barrier that basically penalizes poorer countries that generate more of their energy from fossil fuels. If the ambition is very low, by contrast, the measure ends up being a modest cost passed on to consumers, with little impetus to accelerate the development of low-carbon alternatives. There exists, in other words, a sweet spot. Set the carbon price too high and you splinter the world trading system—one world becomes low carbon, another becomes high carbon, with limited trade between them. Set the price too low and it becomes a modest cost that is absorbed into final prices without much decarbonization impact. The price, therefore, must be just right: it should allow the most technologically advanced firms in emerging economies to be competitive and incentivize the rest to invest in lower-carbon approaches. Otherwise, whatever gains are made inside the low-carbon bloc will be offset by what happens outside of it. Nikos Tsafos is a senior fellow with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

When pressed about climate change, the Trump administration falls back on a familiar defense: the United States has a good record of reducing emissions relative to other countries, which proves, in the administration’s view, that a laissez-faire approach can deliver reductions and that there is no need for more aggressive and heavy-handed policies. In some respects, this is true, although much depends on what timeline one uses for comparing the United States to other countries and also whether one looks at raw data or adjusted for population or GDP. Regardless, there is no doubt that the United States has sharply reduced energy-related CO2 emissions—by roughly 14 percent between 2005 and 2019. Yet the most recent data released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration for 2019 highlight a worrying reality: the United States is no longer reducing emissions. CO2 emissions fell in 2019, but they’re still higher than they were in 2017—and remain unchanged versus 2016. From 2016 to 2019, emissions have fallen by 0.6 percent, which is hardly a record to boast about (in the United Kingdom, the equivalent number was closer to 9 percent). The problem in the United States is overall energy consumption. The carbon intensity of primary energy continues to fall as the country uses less coal, more gas, and more renewables. But overall energy use has risen. Some of that increase is due to weather: 2018 and 2019 were colder than 2016 and 2017, and this led to a 4.3 percent spike in energy use in buildings from 2017 to 2019. But there is also a structural dynamic. Industrial energy use rose by 5.2 percent between 2012 and 2019 (2012 being the low point for energy consumption). Energy use in transportation also jumped 8.3 percent versus 2012. In other words, the primary mechanism that the United States has relied on to reduce emissions—coal to gas switching—is no longer sufficient. The growth in energy consumption is offsetting the gains that come from reducing the carbon intensity of primary energy. And so, even though the United States has an impressive track record in reducing CO2 emissions from energy consumption, that story is mostly in the past, and the trend line since 2016 shows that the United States is no longer on a pathway to reduce emissions.

SynopsisThis paper compares the lifecycle greenhouse gas (GHG) costs of dairy production across 13 countries and pork production across 10 countries to obtain insights about what causes higher or lower emissions. It counts the GHG gas costs of land use by using carbon opportunity costs, a method that assigns fewer emissions based largely on how much land is used to produce a kilogram of milk or pork.

There are few credible scenarios for reaching the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives, such as net-zero by 2050, without the large-scale deployment of CCS technology. Carbon capture and storage technology is a pre-requisite for the decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries, which in the EU are responsible for about a fifth of all greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, carbon capture technologies have only been tested at smaller scales and are not yet available at scale for the multiple energy-intensive industries that need them. To prepare for larger-scale CCS deployment in the period after 2030, steps should be taken today to address economic as well as political barriers, and thereby support development of key infrastructure and technology. In doing so, policy should focus on improving the investment case for both CCS as well as low-carbon industrial products that carbon capture makes possible. This includes specific financing models that account for the high capital intensity of CCS, regional variation in industrial clusters, infrastructure and storage availability as well as the need to combine both private and public money.Recommendations:Plans for CCS deployment should be developed in parallel with analysis on the expected demand for negative emissions, as well as how to deliver these negative emissions. Imperfect capture rates and bio-energy with CCS (BECCS) use will impact this demand.Policy support should target the improvement of capture rates in major energy-intensive industries so that theoretical potentials can be demonstrated.To support scale-up, initial focus should be on industrial clusters where various sources of CO2 can be combined into larger volumes.EU state aid rules (e.g. environmental state aid guidelines) should facilitate member state spending to support CCS infrastructure development.Political choices should be made as to the market and financing models that will apply to CCS development, both on the capital investment side as well as on the operational financing side.

I get asked all the time if the United States will have a federal carbon tax anytime soon. People ask the question for one of a few reasons. Maybe they have heard that oil and gas companies now support a carbon tax. Or perhaps they have spoken with several of the organizations working hard to build support among Republicans in Congress for a carbon tax. Or, more recently, maybe the pure ambition and scope of the Green New Deal lead them to believe that a moderate pathway that includes a carbon tax is surely more palatable. The reality is that a carbon tax is still a long way off and if people want to see it happen, they better push for it harder than they have in the past. Here is a breakdown of the drivers in favor and against a federal carbon tax. Economist all agree that a carbon price is the most economically efficient way to drive down emissions in much of the economy. This is an important driver because it happens to be true as long as the tax is structured correctly. Several months ago, an enormous group of leaders in the field of economics signed on to the letter in favor of carbon fee and dividend program. This is not important because economists came out in favor a carbon tax—that’s about as surprising as a snowman’s preference for cold weather—it is important because of the agreement over the use of revenue. Academic research points to several different uses for revenue derived from a carbon price. It can be used to offset another tax, to reinvest in clean energy research and development (R&D), or to pay for adaptation measures. The decision to use the revenue as a dividend to taxpayers shows the growing concern over protecting consumers from the higher costs of energy that are expected to result from a carbon tax and to make the tax as progressive as possible. It also reflects a sort of consensus with conservatives who do not wish to see the revenue from a carbon tax lead to expanded government programs. The negative here is that politicians do not appear to have nearly as much agreement on the use of revenue, a significant amount by the way, which can be a problem since they are the ones that actually pass legislation. The debate between a carbon tax and a cap and trade program has died down. This is good news because for a long time the debate has been between these two carbon-pricing mechanisms. Cap and trade got a bad rap around the time of the Great Recession when everything that looked like a Wall Street scheme seemed like a scam. If the pendulum has in fact definitely swung toward a tax, this clears up at least one issue that has taken up decades of debate among the proponents of a carbon price—except for the fact that if you look around the country, at least 11 states already have a cap and trade program in place, and exactly zero have a carbon tax (although a number have legislative proposals at present). When asked about whether they would give up their cap and trade program for a federal carbon tax, the answer given by these cap and trade states is a qualified “maybe.” So, while a carbon tax is in ascendance, its best to remember cap and trade programs are far from dead. Some Republicans have proposed carbon taxes and so have some Democrats. The first step in passing legislation in a divided Congress is to make sure members of both parties support the idea. We now have several bone fide examples of carbon tax proposals from Republicans and Democrats (see this great analysis by Resources for the Future). While there are differences in these proposals, if you assumed all the differences could be worked out, you have a grand total of 69 members of Congress supporting a carbon tax enough to propose or sign on to legislation. This is not enough to pass a bill and certainly not enough to override a presidential veto from a climate-unfriendly administration. Supporters of a carbon tax, and other climate policy as well, point to a divide between views in Congress on the issue and the views of the public. Polling does indicate that the public is more unified in its concern over climate change then it would appear based on the views represented in Congress. Unfortunately, this happens to be a feature of modern-day federal policymaking in which Congress has a hard time finding pragmatic paths forward to address issues on which the American public seems to agree. Greater numbers of Republicans and Democrats are comfortable proposing increased support for energy innovation, which is also extremely important. Many of these innovation-only proposals, however, don’t do much to pull new technologies into the market—a carbon tax, as well as other climate policies, could be helpful on that front. Regulation just isn’t what it used to be. One of the main arguments not to pursue a carbon tax is that the trade-off many people are proposing for getting agreement on a carbon tax is to roll back other regulations used to pursue greenhouse gas emissions either directly or as a complementary benefit of a policy designed to address other environmental issues (methane emission, vehicle efficiency standards, etc.). For years, carbon pricing at a federal level has been elusive while regulation has been the main lever through which environmental goals have been pursued and won (in the sense that they cause companies to change behavior). As the last several years have shown, however, the extreme division between Republican and Democratic lawmakers on the use of regulation under authorities like the Clean Air Act as the main vehicle for drastically reducing emissions has only increased regulatory uncertainty. Each change in administration brings about a strengthening or rolling back of regulation based on that last administration’s action. While the so-called “pendulum effect” (coupled with action at the state level) has caused industry to conclude that this ever-present threat of greater regulation means investments in high-carbon assets are risky, it is not enough to drive real and significant emissions reduction. This reality has caused some pro-regulation environmental groups to consider alternatives to the regulatory pathways. On the other hand, proponents of the regulatory pathways see the very same divisive politics as a threat to the stringency of a carbon tax program. Looking around the world, carbon pricing schemes are rife with political interference designed to protect political constituencies or consumers. From an academic standpoint, we know how to mitigate these trade-offs and, through a combination of pricing and regulation, design an optimum climate policy that is both strong and adaptable. How to get from theory to practice is another issue altogether. Costs and benefits are still not understood by members in a meaningful way. Finally, members of Congress still have a steep learning curve to understand contemporary carbon pricing proposals, how they stack up relative to other climate policy options, and the impact they will have on their constituencies. Here, there is a gaping hole. First, members of Congress should not be allowed to think about the costs of a carbon price in a vacuum. They must be considered alongside long-term benefits and avoided costs as well. Second, many other climate policies or regulations obscure the costs more effectively, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they are cheaper. If we are being honest, there is an economic benefit to the policy being cheaper and a political benefit to the policy being perceived as lower cost, and those two things are sometimes different. In this debate, familiarity goes a long way. Policymakers might be more in favor of tax incentives, performance standards, regulations, or portfolio standards because they have some experience with those policies, rather than something new and high-profile like a carbon tax. Finally, any serious attempt to get a carbon price in place need to lay out what it means on a household basis across the country. More work is being done to understand the distributional impacts of a carbon price across income groups in the United States along with recommendations for protecting those least able to bear the costs. Much of this work, however, is being done on a national basis. So far, the battle for carbon pricing has been lost and won at the state level, where the cost per household was a material issue. All members of Congress represent a state with distinctly different energy makeup and citizenry, and it is important to communicate the costs and benefits in a way that resonates in a state or district-specific context. Those who want a carbon tax will need push harder for it. Many proponents of a carbon tax are not naïve—they know that support in Congress, while growing, is not strong enough to get the job done. This line of thinking leads to the rationale that companies, institutions, and politicians that favor a carbon tax should simply be “preparing for when a window of opportunity opens.” This phrase was once a euphemism for the opportunity a carbon tax could play in a tax reform debate before it came and went. Now the phrase is being used for the election of a Democratic president; an occasion that may not arrive in the next election cycle and, even if it does, does not guarantee a carbon price will be a) more palatable in Congress, b) the preferred climate policy lever of the administration, or c) sufficiently high enough on the policy agenda for an administration to garner enough political capital to get it past (i.e., how will it stack up against health care?). Finally, it needs to be recognized that for many proponents of broad-based social change, like proponents of the Green New Deal, even a very aggressive and progressively structured carbon tax will not be enough. Indeed, a carbon tax (like many other policies) does not, on its own, solve for all the difficulties of a changing climate and will need to be enacted along with other measures as well. The outlook for a carbon tax looks uncertain enough to conclude that proponents of this policy will need to push harder for it than they have to date to make it a reality. For energy companies or investor groups, this means not simply including support for a carbon tax in corporate talking points but waging a campaign akin to the ones launched to remove the crude oil export ban, in favor of tax reform, or to roll back Dodd-Frank regulation. For all the talk about carbon taxes, the reality is that it will require a massive and well-coordinated effort from a broad range of stakeholders, so all those in support of the policy better start pushing. Sarah Ladislaw is senior vice president and director and senior fellow of the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

On July 8, President Trump, several cabinet members, and local community representatives spoke for about an hour to defend the Trump administration’s record on the environment. Some of what the president said was narrowly true, but many of the claims put forth in the speech lacked important context to properly interpret the administration’s record. Take for example his statement about carbon emissions. The president said, “since 2000, our nation’s energy-related carbon emissions have declined more than any other country on earth” and went on to say that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has put forth regulations to reduce carbon emissions in the power and transport sectors. Yes, carbon emissions are down from 2000, but they went up by about 3 percent last year. Yes, the United States reduced emissions faster than any other country on an absolute basis, but we remain the second largest overall emitter and largest per capita emitter in the world. Yes, the EPA has indeed proposed several energy sector emissions regulations, but they will be substantially weaker than earlier proposed standards. The good news is that a combination of state level policies, market forces, and technological advancements will make up for some of the gap. The graph below compares the Energy Information Administration’s Annual Energy Outlook 2019 (AEO) against the previous year’s projection, with the blue line showing no additional power sector emissions regulation at the federal level but including new actions taken by states such as California, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, as well as changes in fuel prices and technology costs. These actions help to compensate for the emissions reductions that the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan would have achieved. That being said, the emissions trajectory shown in the AEO 2019 is not on track to decline commensurate with our international commitments and what scientists say will be necessary to limit global average temperature rise. More policy leadership is needed to make that happen.

The amount of additional future temperature change following a complete cessation of CO2 emissions is a measure of the unrealized warming to which we are committed due to CO2 already emitted to the atmosphere. This “zero emissions commitment” (ZEC) is also an important quantity when estimating the remaining carbon budget – a limit on the total amount of CO2 emissions consistent with limiting global mean temperature at a particular level. In the recent IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 ∘C, the carbon budget framework used to calculate the remaining carbon budget for 1.5 ∘C included the assumption that the ZEC due to CO2 emissions is negligible and close to zero. Previous research has shown significant uncertainty even in the sign of the ZEC. To close this knowledge gap, we propose the Zero Emissions Commitment Model Intercomparison Project (ZECMIP), which will quantify the amount of unrealized temperature change that occurs after CO2 emissions cease and investigate the geophysical drivers behind this climate response. Quantitative information on ZEC is a key gap in our knowledge, and one that will not be addressed by currently planned CMIP6 simulations, yet it is crucial for verifying whether carbon budgets need to be adjusted to account for any unrealized temperature change resulting from past CO2 emissions. We request only one top-priority simulation from comprehensive general circulation Earth system models (ESMs) and Earth system models of intermediate complexity (EMICs) – a branch from the 1 % CO2 run with CO2 emissions set to zero at the point of 1000 PgC of total CO2 emissions in the simulation – with the possibility for additional simulations, if resources allow. ZECMIP is part of CMIP6, under joint sponsorship by C4MIP and CDRMIP, with associated experiment names to enable data submissions to the Earth System Grid Federation. All data will be published and made freely available.

概要运行期间不排放温室气体的建筑对于实现可持续发展目标和《巴黎协定》的目标至关重要。但在过去，零碳建筑被认为只有技术先进或富裕的国家才能实现。世界资源研究所的最新研究发现，无论位置或发展状况如何，都有实现零碳建筑的政策途径。该报告确定了各国可以通过减少能源需求和清洁能源供应来实现零碳建筑的八条途径。

为了实现《巴黎协定》的目标，并将本世纪全球气温上升限制在1.5°C，全球经济必须迅速转型。需要制定碳价格，将气候变化成本纳入经济决策，以大幅减少美国温室气体排放，特别是在电力行业。然而，碳价格并不是应对气候变化的灵丹妙药。需要对碳价格采取补充政策。这些政策和计划必须解决市场壁垒，并推动长期的深度减排。

This policy insight outlines different perspectives on the past performance of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in terms of its allowance price, analyses how the recent reform responded to related challenges , and considers the case for introducing a carbon price floor in the EU ETS. The main part of the paper identifies five myths in the debate about an EU ETS price floor and critically challenges them. It concludes by discussing potential entry points for introducing a carbon price floor in the context of the upcoming EU climate policy process.It builds on the workshop EU ETS Reform: Taking Stock and Examining Carbon Price Floor Options, held at CEPS in Brussels on July 3, 2018. The workshop was cosponsored by CEPS and the AHEAD and Mistra Carbon Exit projects. While the paper draws on insights from workshop discussions, its views are solely those of the authors.Christian Flachsland is head of the working group Governance at MCC Berlin. Michael Pahle is head of the working group Energy Strategies Europe & Germany at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). Dallas Burtraw is Darius Gaskins Senior Fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF). Ottmar Edenhofer is the director of the Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC). Milan Elkerbout is a Research Fellow at CEPS Energy Climate House. Carolyn Fischer is professor of environmental economics at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (VU), School of Business and Economics, Department of Spatial Economics. Oliver Tietjen is a PhD student at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). Lars Zetterberg is programme director of Mistra Carbon Exit; IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute.CEPS Policy Insights offer analyses of a wide range of key policy questions facing Europe. As an institution, CEPS takes no position on questions of European policy. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a process in which carbon dioxide (CO2) is captured from emissions of industrial and energy production processes, and is stored without returning to the atmosphere. The goal of the process is to reduce the impact of anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHGs) on climate change. CCS is composed of 3 main stages: Capture- separation of CO2 from other gases in the industrial\energy production process; Transportation- transporting CO2 from its capture site to its storage site; and Storage- Injecting CO2 into underground rock formations\ aquifers for long term confinement. Alternately, it can be used in industrial processes for goods productions (carbon capture and utilization- CCU). There is a whole array of CCS technologies. Some are already in successful use for decades, while others are under development or in transition to an industrial scale. Globally, there are about 35 active CCS projects and about 20 more in different development stages today. The existing projects are capturing together more than 30 million tons of CO2 annually (only 0.1% of anthropogenic GHGs emissions), and they operate in power plants and in industrial processes.Research goals: to review the global CCS sector: technologies, facilities, applications and policy. To compare the maturity, efficiency and cost of CCS technologies. To perform a preliminary comparison of CCS solutions in the natural gas-based fuel substitution sector that might be realized in Israel, according to the fuel substitutes' national plan for 2030.Main findings: * Natural gas processing and compressed natural gas (CNG) production- Israel's natural gas reservoirs hardly contain CO2. Therefore, there is no need for CCS in these processes. * Methanol production- 50% of CO2 emissions can be prevented by applying CCU, without a net cost to the facility or even with profit. However, this amount would be only 0.25% of Israel's annual anthropogenic GHGs emissions. * Gas-to-liquid (GTL) production- 1.5-3% of Israel's annual anthropogenic GHGs emissions can be captured cheaply, with only 3.5% increase in the GTL production cost. * Electricity generation in natural gas- powered power plants (NGCC)- pp to 30% of Israel's annual anthropogenic GHGs emissions can be captured. However, this is the most expensive solution per captured ton of CO2, which will increase electricity production cost by 30-60%.* Minor implementation of CCS in natural gas-based fuel substitutes facilities will capture, transport and store 3 million tons of CO2 annually, at a cost of 450-900 million ILS (New Israeli Shekel) (3% of Israel's GHGs emissions). * Medium implementation of CCS in natural gas-based fuel substitutes facilities will capture, transport and store 6 million tons of CO2 annually, at a cost of 750-1,650 million ILS (6% of Israel's GHGs emissions). * Wide implementation of CCS in natural gas-based fuel substitutes facilities will capture, transport and store 25-30 million tons of CO2 annually, at a cost of 7,600-19,200 million ILS (25-30% of Israel's GHGs emissions). Only implementing this option (or a part of it), can substantially reduce Israel's annual GHGs emissions, in-line with CCS's role as perceived by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change).Policy recommendations: Promotion of policy tools is essential for initiating and\or accelerating CCS development. These include governmental tracking and adherence to economy-wide GHGs emission reduction goals, in-accord with the Paris agreement goals (2015); policy consolidation, including economic incentives (energy efficiency, renewable energy, CCS facilities, carbon pricing\tax) to promote medium-term emissions reduction according to the long-term goals; explicitly include CCS in national programs for climate change mitigation or in flagship policy statements, and to stress CCS's role alongside low-carbon technologies; to secure long-term governmental CCS policy, in order to assure the relevant industrial and economic sectors; to establish public/ private engagement for risk and uncertainty reduction; accelerating storage planning and investment, in view of the long time needed for storage locations development.

简介本工作文件的目的是探索美国技术除碳的潜力，确定大规模部署过程中可能出现的需求，并考虑如何开始解决这些需求。这篇工作论文是世界资源研究所（WRI）系列出版物《碳射击：美国大规模除碳的创造选择》的一部分。该系列介绍了世界资源研究所领导的对美国扩大候选碳去除方法和技术需求的评估结果。

简介本案例研究收集了法国国家低碳战略发展的经验教训。它详细介绍了法国到2050年实现低碳经济计划的制定过程。

简介通过碳税实现美国的排放目标，深入了解将排放目标机制纳入强有力的国家碳税如何有助于确保实现预期的减排。这一机制建立了可预测的方法，可以随着时间的推移调整碳定价计划，以应对减排的任何不足。该报告描述了一个基本的两步过程——定期评估减排是否有望实现目标，如果减排低于预期，则采用调整机制。

简介这篇工作论文是世界资源研究所（WRI）出版的系列出版物《CarbonShot:美国大规模除碳的创新选择》的一部分。该系列介绍了世界资源研究所领导的对美国扩大候选碳去除方法和技术需求的评估结果。本工作文件为美国政策制定者和气候界提供了与碳去除相关的几个基本问题的入门读物，包括以下内容：

Synopsis全球越来越多的企业正转向内部碳定价，将其作为管理气候相关风险和向低碳经济转型的工具。早期迹象表明，内部碳定价也在向进步的印度企业进军。但早期推动者报告称，需要就如何在印度实施碳定价提供有针对性的指导。为了应对这一挑战，本初级读本为制定和实施内部碳定价计划提供了一种七步走的方法。

Facts On February 20, Singapore released its 2017 budget, which included a proposed carbon tax to begin in 2019. The budget awaits approval from Singapore’s parliament and final assent from the president. The government will consult with stakeholders before specifying details about the tax, though the budget document suggested the tax would fall between S$10 and S$20 (US$7 and $14) per metric ton of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Six GHGs will likely be targeted by the tax: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous dioxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF­6). The budget document states that “the tax will generally be applied upstream, for example, on power stations and other large direct emitters, rather than electricity users.” Singapore would be the first country in Southeast Asia to levy a carbon tax. Elsewhere in the region, Japan has a national carbon tax, while Kazakhstan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan have emissions trading schemes. China has experimented with regional cap-and-trade programs and is expected to launch the world’s largest national carbon market later this year. After the Paris climate agreement, Singapore pledged to reduce its GHG emissions intensity by 36 percent by 2030 from 2005 levels. Opinion The decision to levy a carbon tax is an important gesture signifying that Singapore is committed to addressing climate change, although the country is a marginal emitter of GHGs, accounting for barely more than 0.1 percent of total global emissions. By shouldering a price on carbon, Singapore can assume a leadership role in a region whose GHG emissions are expected to nearly double by 2040. Depending on how the carbon tax is implemented, however, Singapore’s refining, petrochemicals, and power sectors could be significantly affected as the city-state relies heavily on fossil fuels. Singapore is the world’s third-largest exporter of refined petroleum products and has a refining capacity of 1.51 million barrels per day (bpd). The petroleum refining and petrochemical industries account for approximately 40 percent of Singapore’s exports. According to Singapore’s National Climate Change Secretariat, the taxation threshold may be set at 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, which could affect 30 to 40 large, direct emitters. The Secretariat also estimated that the tax could increase operating costs for Singapore’s refiners by US$3.50 to $7.00 per barrel—a level prohibitively high if the Singaporean refinery industry is to remain competitive. Wood Mackenzie, alternatively, estimated the cost for refiners would be between US$0.40 and $0.70 per barrel. Singapore’s share of exports to Australia and Vietnam are already falling due to stiffer competition from China, Malaysia, and South Korea. Moreover, countries around Southeast Asia are contributing to a more competitive regional market for refined petroleum products. This year, Vietnam is expected to bring 200,000 bpd of refining capacity online with its Nghi Son refinery. Malaysia is expected to complete its Refinery and Petrochemicals Industrial District (RAPID) refinery by 2019, possibly producing 300,000 bpd and 7.7 million tons of petrochemicals annually. The ultimate effect of the tax on the competitiveness of Singapore’s refinery industry would depend on how Singapore chooses to implement it. The effect of carbon pricing on other regional refiners has thus far been mixed. For example, South Korea, which is among the top refiners in the world, has eased into its emissions trading scheme since 2015 and will charge for emissions permits until its second stage begins in 2018; even then, “energy-focused industries” may be exempted. Japan has had a carbon tax since 2012, but shrinking domestic demand and capacity expansion by regional competitors seem to be a much bigger challenge to its refining industry. Singapore may try to counterbalance the increased costs for refining, petrochemicals, and generation. For instance, portions of the carbon tax revenue could be redirected to support energy efficiency improvements in the refining and petrochemicals sector. Alternatively, Singapore may divert revenues to fund solar power and energy storage development, although the city-state has limited renewable energy options. Currently, Singapore depends on natural gas for more than 95 percent of its electric generation capacity. The proposed carbon tax underpins the country’s commitment to the Paris Agreement and signals its recognition that every country—large or small—has a role to play in addressing the global challenge. Meanwhile, the Singaporean experience with a carbon tax may also serve as an important test whether downstream development can accompany stricter environmental protections, such as reduced emissions.

Reducing long-term greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the industry sector is one of the toughest challenges of the energy transition. Combustion and process emissions from cement manufacturing, iron- and steelmaking, and chemical production are particularly problematic.But there are a variety of current and future options to increase the uptake of renewables as one possible way to reduce industry sector energy and process carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, which we examine in detail in a new IEA Insight Paper, Renewable Energy for Industry.The main finding is that the recent rapid cost reductions in solar photovoltaics (PV) and wind power may enable new options for greening the industry, either directly from electricity or through the production of hydrogen (H)-rich chemicals and fuels. Simultaneously, electrification offers new flexibility options to better integrate large shares of variable renewables into grids.

碳捕获与封存(CCS)技术有望在全球气候应对中发挥重要作用。随着《巴黎协定》的批准，CCS在发电和工业过程中(包括现有设施)减少化石燃料排放的能力，对于将未来气温上升限制在“远低于2°C”至关重要。如果要实现这些雄心勃勃的目标，CCS技术还需要在本世纪下半叶实现“负排放”。CCS技术并不新鲜。今年是挪威Sleipner CCS项目运营的第20个年头，该项目从海上天然气生产设施中捕获了近1700万吨二氧化碳，并将其永久储存在海底深处的砂岩地层中。CCS的个别应用已经在工业过程中使用了几十年，自20世纪70年代初以来，美国就开始实施注入二氧化碳以提高石油采收率(EOR)的项目。本出版物回顾了过去20年来CCS技术的进展，并考察了它们在实现2°C和远低于2°C目标方面的作用。基于国际能源机构的2°C情景，它还考虑了如果CCS不作为应对措施的一部分对气候变化的影响。报告还探讨了加快未来CCS部署的机会，以实现《巴黎协定》设定的气候目标。

本文件简要介绍了欧洲联盟最外层区域可再生能源的发展情况，重点是这些区域在创造可持续经济发展机会的同时促进绿色过渡的潜力。报告审查了欧盟其他区域在可再生能源方面的现有政策框架和工具，并提出了具体的政策建议。本文件是在欧盟-经合组织全球最外层区域项目框架内编写的。

国际能源署对全球进展的最新评估显示，一些清洁能源技术（如太阳能光伏和电动汽车）的部署速度表明，只要有足够的雄心和政策行动，就可以实现目标，但能源系统的大多数组成部分迫切需要更快的变革，以在2050年前实现净零排放。

国际能源署宣布的承诺情景估计，到2040年，将电动汽车库存从目前的1700万辆增加到8.08亿辆，有助于将交通排放量减少36%。交通脱碳的好处得益于电力系统的脱碳，这为具有雄心勃勃的可变可再生能源部署目标的新兴和发展中经济体提供了机会。正在进行电气化的交通方式的多样性，从公共交通到个人电动汽车、两轮车和三轮车，以及配电网层面的充电基础设施的位置，都需要明智的策略来确保平稳和安全的整合。本报告着眼于数字化智能充电的部署如何有助于改善电网安全和脱碳，并提供了一套与新兴和发展中经济体相关的政策和监管建议。

GJETC提出了三项新的研究和政策建议

二氧化碳就是二氧化碳就是二氧化碳——排放上限的影响是一项新的研究，该研究发现，如果政策制定者想减少加拿大的二氧化碳排放，他们应该允许工业界以尽可能低的成本来减少二氧化碳排放，而不是任意限制某些部门的排放，如石油和天然气，同时允许其他部门继续增加排放，因为CO2分子无论其来源如何都是相同的。

新的低碳技术显示出改变全球能源系统的明显潜力，但一个关键挑战仍然存在：政府和行业需要采取哪些措施来确保其开发和部署？路线图是一个有用的工具，有助于在国家、区域和全球各级战略性地解决复杂问题。为了帮助将政治声明和分析工作转化为具体行动，国际能源署制定了一系列致力于低碳能源技术的全球路线图。

发表关于利用全球盘点进行有效部门气候治理的意见文章

这项研究没有考察总排放趋势，而是深入研究了影响欧盟能源系统每个部门的动态。它研究了电力生产、运输、建筑和工业中正在发生的结构变化，并将这些变化与实现2030年和2050年目标所需的变化进行了比较。这样做的目的是影响成员国和欧盟层面未来政策决策的雄心和方向。

第28届联合国气候变化大会（COP28）和国际能源署（IEA）高级别对话就能源转型的关键要素达成了强有力的共识。这一结论标志着联合主席、COP28主席苏丹·贾比尔博士和国际能源署执行主任法提赫·比罗尔博士取得了重大成就。

就在2023年圣诞节前达成的欧盟电力市场规则改革，创造了新的工具来支持可再生能源投资，保护消费者，并使电网更加灵活和数字化。与今年早些时候通过的旨在实现欧盟独立于俄罗斯能源进口的RePowerEU计划一起，这是朝着到2035年实现以无化石能源为主的电力系统迈出的重要一步。